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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LOHHAlXE ~ULLKR and
rRYTNl{; B. l\llLLER,

~llLJ,_;t:;

Plaintiff!i and Be!izwndents,
vs.
\\' ALl'O~ I{ BANK & TRUST CO.,
Executor of the Last Will and
T<'starnt>nt of XJ~rrTIE KNUDSEN

Case
No.
10272

JlILLER, Deceased, and VIOLA
~fILLER CARLSON,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
rrhis \\'as a suit to quiet title, whereby the plaintiffs
and n•spondents sought a construction of a will to give
plaintiffs a remainder interest or a b~neficial interest
under a trust, following a life interest in defendants'
predecessor. Tlw defendants and appellants counterclaimed, contending that an unqualified fee interest in
CTPf<>ndants' predecessor was created by the will and confirmed by the decree of distribution.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs and dPfendants both moved for summan
judgment. The court granted plaintiffs' motion, holdin~
that plaintiffs were each owners of an undivided om
quarter interest in the real property in question and
denied defendants' motion.
RJDLIEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and appellants seek reversal of tl1e
judgment, ·with det(~rmination that the will created an
unqualified fee simple interest, with neither trust limitations on the fee nor remainder interests in plaintiffs.
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
Miles E. Miller died May 29, 1956, leaving a will dateJ
March 20, 1941 (R. 45, 46), which was admitted to
probate in Salt Lake County. The entire probate file,
No. 38583 is included in this record (R. 44).
Miles Miller's heirs were his widow, Nettie, and
three children by a prior marriage, Lorraine and Irvine
Miller, the plaintiffs and respondents, and Viola Carlson,
defendant and appellant. Nettie was married to Miles
in 1921 (R. 32). Zola Miller Smith, Miles' fourth child
and Viola's twin, predeceased Miles, dying in 1954 (R.
23). All of Miles' children were under 12 years of age
when Miles married Nettie (R. 32), and Nettie raised
these children. The three surviving children were ages
44 to 49 in 1956.
Miles' will namPd Nettie as his executrix and rnarle
one donative provision, namely:
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"SECOND. I give, devise and bequeath to my
beloved wife, Nettie Knudsen Miller, all of my
prnperty, whether the same be real or personal
or mixed, and I do this acknowledging all my
l'hildn'n hereinafter named, and for the reason
that I know that my beloved wife will, care for
lllY children from the remainder of my estate, if
th(•J'(' IH· an:-·, slian• and share alike; MilPs Lorraine Miller, son; Irvine Bagley Miller, son;
Viola Miller Carlsen, daughter; Zola Miller Smith,
daughter; all n'sidents of the State of Utah"
(R. 45).

Notice was given in the probate to the widow and
the thrcP surviving children, being plaintiffs Lorraine
and [rvinP Miller and defendant Viola Carlson. Miles'
Pstatc eonsisted entirely of one parcel of real property,
a four-plex in Salt Lake County, which was appraised
at $34,000. R~- Deeree of Distribution dated September
27, 1956, Miles' estate \\-as distributed, the decree providing as follows:
"NOVl THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECRgED as
follows: '
l. That in accordance with the Last Will and
'l'estament of deceased the entire rest, residue and
remainder of the estate of Miles Edward Miller,
also known as Miles E. Miller, deceased, is distributed and set over to Nettie Knudsen Miller.
Said property consists of the following:

Real property located at 2630 to 2650 South
~nd I1Jast, Salt Lake C'onnty, State of lTtah,
and more particularly described as follows:
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(legal de:,;cription)
2. All pro1wrty of dPC('USL'd hereafter dis
covered or not now known he, and the :,;ame is
hereby set ovPr, distributed and transferred to
Nettie Knudsen Millt>r" (R. 17).
Nettie improvPd and rent Pd tltP fonr-1) lex and used
all income for her own purpost's to her death on May
17, 19G--t (R. 3:J). XdtiP left a will, naming dPfendant
Walkt'r Bank & 'l'rust Company as Executor, and after
making certain s1wcific bequests, she gavP, devised and
bequeathed the entire remainder of her estate to her
step-daughtPr, def<>ndant Viola Carlson, who had cared
for and nursed Nettie during the last three years of her
life. \Valker Bank & Trust Co. is presently acting as
the E~xecutor of Nettie's estate and is managing thr four.
plex property in question (R. 9).
The complaint of plaintiffs Lorraine and Irvine
Miller (R. 1-3) sought to quiet title to the four-plex
property, alleging that 1\Iiles ·Miller had "devised his
real estate to his widow for her use and maintenance
during her lifetime, tlw remainde1· to be divided at her
death among his four childn,'n, share and shan· alih"
(R. 1), and that plaintiffs are each the owner of a one·
fourth undivided interest in fee si11111le in said proper~·
and are entitled to joint possession with defendant
Viola Carlson and the heirs of Zola Smith, dt>~ea~\·il.
Plaintiffs did not qrn·stion the decree of distribution.
but conceded that distrihution was "in accordancr with
said last will and testament" (R. 2).
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DPl'l·mlanb answered and eounter-daimed allPgino·
'
0
that 1tndl'r tht• residual provision of Miles' will an un,1ualifi1•d fe1• simph-- interest was devised to Nettie and
that th<' D1•neP of Distribution of September 27 1956
'
'
in distri huting the entire n•siduP to X ettie made the
n·:-;iduar~· dPvis1-- res judieata, final and impervious to
plaintiffa' collatPral attack (R. 8-11).
Dt'f<'ndants and plaintiffs filed motions for summar)' judgu1ent which were heard on the basis of the
affidavits of Yiola Carlson (R. 23) and Grant H. Bagley
(H. ;);2, ;);3), the .Mil PS :Miller probate file (R. 44) and the
~Jiles .Mill(--r will (R. 45, 46).
At th<· hParing before Judge Fmett, counsel for plaintiffs arguPd that an implied trust for the benefit of
~Jiles' <'hildren was created by the language of the will
which followPd the residuary provision. Defendants
eontended that :Miles' will in giving the entire residue to
~dtiP c·reated in her an unqualified fee simple interest,
that thP simple rPf erence to the will in the decree of
distribution showed only that Miles died testate, but did
not allow ref erenct• back to the precatory words of the
will to qualify the fee, and that after 8 years the probate
<lecreP was final and not subject to collateral attack.
The judgment (R. 37-39) denied defendants' motion,
granted plaintiffs' motion and adjudged that plaintiffs
were owners in fee simple title of an undivided one-quartn interest each in the four-plex propPrty, and that plaintiffs, defendant Viola Carlson and the children of Zola
Rmith, deceased, per stirpes were entitled to possession
of :;;aid real property as tenants in common.
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ARG-Ul\H!JNT
POINT I.
THE PROBATE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION PROPERLY CONSTRUED THE WILL AND GAVE TO NETTIE MILLER AN UNQUALIFIED FEE Sil\IPLE INTEREST.

If any fnrth<'l' t·orn-;trudion of l\lilt;s nl illPr\ 11ilJ
can be made at this latt• date, an examination of Paragra1)h Second (R. -1:5) clearly shows the work of a frugal
draftsman, who combined three separate provisions in
one paragraph, nnd in fad in om· compound sentence. 'l'he
first part is the entire residuary provision, stating, "I
give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Nettie
Knudsen l\1iller, all of my property, ·whether the same be
rE:al or personal or mixed, . . . " Next is stated the
necessary acknowledgment of Miles' children, as follows:
"and I do this acknowledging all my children hereinafter
named, ... " And finally, there is the added expression
of hope and confidence, ''and for the reason that I kn01r
that my beloved wife will, care for my children from
the remainder of my estate, if there he any, share and
share alike: l\Iiles Lorraine l\1mer, son; Irvine Bagley
Miller, son; Viola Miller Carlsen, daughter; Zola Mi!IPr
Smith, daughter; all residents of the State of Ftah."

This court has clearly answered any question as to
the proper construction of the Miller will by its decision
in Jn re Gall's Estate, 15 Utah 2d 1, 386 P.2d 125. The
Call v.rill devised the residue in one provision, then in
subsequent language prm.rided that the residue should
go to other beneficiaries on the deaths of the first d.e•
•
1n
visees. The court held that when the estate is given
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fel'. ::;imple absolute in one clause, "the interest so devised
eannot he taken away or diminished by any subsequent
provisions of doubtful import, or by any inferences dednctibl<' therefrom repugnant to the estate given." (Emphasi::; added.) The court gave emphasis to the fact
that the entire rest, residue and remainder of that testatrix' estate was given and devised, stating:
''Such language certainly expresses an intention of the testatrix that a fee simple title to her
property be conveyed to the children upon her
death. This paragraph of the will is controlling
unless it clearly appears from other provisions
that the testatrix intended to convey a lesser
estate."
The court cited 74-1-36 UCA 1953, which provides:

''74-1-36. Devise Conveys All of Testator's
Interest. Every devise of land in any will conveys
all the estate of the devisor therein which he could
lawfully devise, unless it clearly appears by the
will that he intended to convey a less estate."
The court showed that it was not unmindful of 74-2-9
HCA 1953, which provides that all provisions of a will
should be given effect, if possible, and also 74-2-1 UCA
1953, which generally provides that the testator's intPntion "must have effect as far as possible," and cited
are Schamp v. Brown, 215 Ore. 714, 335 P.2d 847, In re
8hira's Estate, 82 Ohio Law Abs. 307, 165 N.E.2d 60, and
.J, Ho ire-Parker: Page 011 Wills, p. 647.
Schamp v. Brown involved reciprocal husband and
wifr will::;, with a provision for the rP::;idm' to go to the
'lll\'iving spouse. Following was a provision that the

8
survivor would be bound not to change the share which
children would ultimately receive by the reciprocal will.
The Oregon court held:

"It is a well-recognized rule that when an e~
tate in an absolute fee is given in one clause of a
will, as in Article IV here, the interest which the
devisee then obtains cannot be taken away or
diminished by any subsequent or general expres
sions of doubtful import, or by any inference de
ductible therefrom that may be repugnant to the
estate given."
Cited is 1 Underhill on Law of Wills, Sec. 33S, and an
Oregon statute which is almost identical in language
to our 74-1-36 UCA 1953.

In re Shim's Estate distinguished situations where
(1) remainders were clearly created, with or without
powers of disposal or use in the first taker, and (2) the
situation created hy the J\liller will, where tlwre i' a
devise to A generally, with no power of disposal ex·
pressed or with an absolute power but followed by a
devise to B of what shall remain undisposed of at A'1
death. In the latter situation, tlw Ohio court held that
A takes a fee simple and that the attempted limitation
over is impossible and void. The court said:
"The testator is, in effect, attempting to make
a will for the first devisee, to take effect in case
the first devisee fails to make one for himself, or
otherwise disposes of the property. This the test·
at w cannot do ... A fre once given, cannot be
cut down by other provisions of the will. A re·
mainder cannot be engrafted on a fee."
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+ Bu we-Parker:

Page un Willi;, lJ. 647, states the

rule:

"If words creating a fee are clear, it will not
he cut down to a lesser estate by words which
are vague or from which an intention to cut down
the fee can be drawn only by inference."

4 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, p. 652, states:
"Where testator devises realty to one, with
suggestions as to its ultimate disposition by devisee, which are not mandatory, and which do not
amount to a precatory trust, the devisee takes a
fee simple." Cited are In re Hayward Estate,
57 Ariz. 51, 110 P.2d 956, and Schuster Estate, 137
Cal. App. 125, 289 P.2d 847.
The Hayward case involved the (ollowing language
after an absolute devise: "My wish is that my estate be
kept within my descendants." These were held to be
precatory words only and were not testamentary, and
the Arizona court quoted the general rule from 19 Am.
Jur. 575, Sec. 120:
"Where there is in an absolute devise of property, a subsequent clause expressing a wish, desire
or direction for its disposition after death of
devisee or legatee will not def eat the devise or
limit the estate in the property to a right to possession or use during the life of the devisee, but
rather the absolute devise stands and the other
clause is to be regarded as presenting precatory
language."
In the Schuster case, the testator gave the residue
to the beneficiary with the provision that he should "distribute as he deems wisest." This bequest was held not
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to creak a trust or to limit the outright and
character of the bequest.

absolut~

In Newhall v. McGill, 69 Ar ii. 259, 212 P.2d 7G4, t) 11 •
court held that where the testator named his sister as
executrix and devised pro1wrty to her "to be cared for
and disposed of according to my personal directions to
her," the quoted words were merely precatory, that the
devise was in foe and not in trust, and that mere preca.
tory words will not create a trust.
In re Ferdun'::; },'state, 91 Cal. App. G22, 205 P.~cl
±56, involved a will with the following language: "11Jwnthing I mrn to John. Kerp the vinyard as long as you
live and at the time of your death, you leave it to
Ernest." The court held that this did not create a trust;
that then• must be imperative language - not \\islws.
hopes or precatory words.

The general rule is stated in 96 C.J.S. 231, Sec. 802,
as follows: "Broadly speaking, an t>state or interest devised or bequeathed by will is neither enlarged nor l'l'duced by subsequent language unless there is a clearly t'\
pressed intent to do so." Cited is Bills v. Bills, 77 Iowa
179, 45 N.vV. HS, as tlw leading case, with the rule therr
restated:
"When there is an absolute or unlimited devise or bequest of property, a subsequent clm'.sf'
expressing a wish, desire or direction for its dif'position after the death of the devisee or leg~te;.
will not def Pat the devise or bequest, nor ]Innt
the estate or interest in thl' property to the right
to possession and use during the life of the de-
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or legatee. The absolute devise or bequest
stands, and the other clause must be regarded
as presenting precatory language. The will must
be interpreted to invest in the devisee or legatee
the fee simple title of the land, and the absolute
property in the subject of the bequest."
vist~e

'l'he language of the Miles Miller residuary bequest
and devise was clear in giving all interest of the testator
to his wife. It was followed by the statement that the
testator did have four named children and that the devise
was made acknowledging that fact. If any emphasis of
the fact of a devise of an absolute fee interest was necP~sary, tlw testator gave such by those added words.
ThP language which follows the devise at best expre:oses Miles' wish or hope. He said: "I know that my
beloved wife will care for my children from the remainder of my estate, if there be any, share and ska.re alike ..."
Each of the italicized words or phrases actually creates
an ambiguity from which could be taken different meanings, if any one of those words or phrases required an
exact construction.

"/ know" certainly indicates a wish, feeling of confidence, desire or direction, but not a mandate, and certanly nothing to create a remainder or a beneficial interest under a trust. "Will care for" normally means to
support, maintain or physically take care of someone
on a current day to day basis. See 41 Words and Phrases
17. In Hewey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 100 Me. 523,
G~ Atl. 600, "care" was defined as "responsibility or over~ight, watchful regard and attention." In Ballenger v.
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Ballenger, 208 Ala. 1±7, 9-1 ~o. 127, "take care of" wa,
construed to mean "to support, maintain, feed and clothe,
look after, attention in sickness." To give the phrase
"will care for" any other meaning in the vernacular would
only compound the confusion and emphasize the uncer
tainty of all of tlw language following the devise of the
fee.

A will speaks as of, or takes effect only upon the
death of the testator; however, for purposes of testamentary interpretation the will must be considered with
reference to th1:~ circumstances existing at the time of
execution. 57 Am. Jiir. 795, Sec. 1209. "From the rr
mainder of my estate, if there be any," can only mean
that Miles had in mind all of his estate in 1941 and including property owned by him then but not in 1956 at hii
death, and not just the one parcel of real property now
in question. This again shows an expression of hope and
wish. "Share and share alike" refers to the four of Mil~i
children alive in 1941, all of whom were then adults (R
23). Zola Smith died in 1954, predeceasing Miles by t111•
years. No provision is made for Zola's chil<ln'n. Thi,
phrase and its legal ap1Jlication can add only more un·
certainty as to the wishful thinking of the testator and th1•
legal effect of that language, if it should be considered ai
a qualification of a fee interest previously given to Nettie
The respondents indicated in their complaint that
they assumed that a life estate was given to Nettie witli
remainder interests in the children (R. 1, 2). At the
hearing before the District Court the respondents argued
that the will created an implied trust with Nettie being
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thl· truskl'. HPspondents' failurP to eonsistantly hold
to mw tltPory for eonstruction of these words is itself
proof of the nneertaint;· and amhiguity of the language.
Bd'on· .Judge I•~llett thP respondt•nts argued for a
l'onstrnetion of an implied trust, relying on Jn re Dewey's
f,'..;fafr, -l:G i ·tah 9~, 143 P. 1:24, in arriving at l\liles' inh·nt. Tlw Dncey case involved a direct appeal from a
i'ontest in pro hat<' n•garding distrihution. Jn the Dewey
1rill tlw te;;tator gave clear instruction to one 'l'uttle to
<fo:trilrnh· and sprinkle the residue among certain persons, and it provided a specific separate bequest for
Tuttle, whieh gave further n•ason for the court's finding
of a trust in thP residue. There was no ambiguity and on
thP contrary a mandate for distribution.
'I:'he instant judgment (R. 37-39) would seem to
follow the theory of a life estate with remainders, as it
giws l\I il<•;;' d<'<'PasPd daughter';;; childn-'n remainder interests.
The language following the clear devise of a fee
simple absolute expressed only l\Iiles' general wishes.
It is ambiguous and uncertain. It cannot subtract from
the fee clt•arly devisPd by thP prior and separate provision. 'I'lw intention of the testator, <'Xpressed in 1941,
was patently a <kvise in frp simplP ahsohite, followed
b;: wishes and sentiment:-:. )Jo construdion of ~1 iles' will

should now lw allowed which would trnd<• a c·Prtainty for a

doubt.
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POINT II.
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION WAS COMPLETE,
CERTAIN, UNAMBIGUOUS AND FINAL AND ALLOWED
NO REFERENCE BACK TO THE WILL FOR INTERPRE.
TATION.

The respondents seem to avoid considering their
present suit to quiet title m; any attack on the DPr·rr1
of Distribution entered September 27, 1956. No fraud,
lack of jurisdiction, or other matter going to the valid.
ity of the decree was alleged, and in fact, respondenb
alleged in Paragraph 4 of their complaint that distribu.
tion in Miles' estate was made "in accordance with thr
will" (R 2). They argued before Judge Ellett that thi~
phrase in the decree of distribution was incorporation by
reference of the will into the decree.
A very general rule is set out at 34 C.J.S. 453, Sec,
529(a), that a decree of distribution is subject to inter
pretation when its language is vague, uncertain or ambig
uous; however,
"An absolute and unequivocal final decrei•
of distribution is not made ambiguous by a recital
that the distribution is according to the will, and
where the final decree of distribution necessarili
construes the will and is not ambiguous or mad~
subject to the will, the will cannot be resorted to
in order to modify or affect it."
In re Miller's Estate, 132 Minn. 316, 156 N.W. 349,
cited by C.J.S., held:
"In the case of the estate of a testate the fina!
decree of distribution of the probate court neces·
sarilv construes the will in distributing the estate,
and ·unless made subject to the provisions of the
will' or unless ambiguous or uncertain on its face,

tlw will may not be resorted to for the purpose of
modifying or affecting the decree.
"A final decree of distribution which in absolutP and unequivocal terms has assigned the whole
Pstatc to one person is not affected with uncertaint>· or ambiguity by a n~cital that the distribution
is in accordancP with the tPrms of the will."

'l'lw California court in h1 re Wallace's E:;tate, 98
('al. App. 285, :219 P.2d 910, stated:
"A plain and unambiguous provision in the
dt-cree of distribution, once the decree has become
final, cannot under the doctrine of res judicata, be
impaired or contradicte>d by a reference to the
will, even if incorporated in the decree by way
of recital."
See also Shipley v. Jordan, 206 Cal. 439, 274 P. 745.
The rule appears to be clear that the decree of distribution, where it is clear and unequivocal, is final and
may not lw impeached by reference back to the will, even
if the decn'P is erroneous, except on appeal. In re Ryan's
Rstate, 96 Cal. App. 2d 7&7, 216 P.2d 497; In re Haney's
Estate, 17+ Cal. App. 2d 1, 344 P.2d 16; In re Loring's
Estate, :29 Cal.2d 423, 175 P.2d 524.

In In re Ewer's Estate, 170 Cal. 660, 171 P. 683,
reference in the decree of distribution was made to the
will by the language "in accordance with the last will,"
and the court lwld the decree to be impervious to attack,
thP <lPcree to prevail owr the will, and the quoted language not to make any possible incorporation by reference
to allow further construction of the will.
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Our court in Nelson v. llrncells, 75 lltah 461, 286P.
631, has held that a will is interpreted by the probate
decree of distribution and that it is not subject to a dif.
ferent interpretation on a collateral attack. In AiterbacJ
v. Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112, tlw drcrl'r
recited that administration and distribution was "in ac
cordance with the testator's will," and further intt>rpretation after the final decree was not allowed. Se<> also /11
re Latsis Estate, 3 Utah 2d 3G5, 284 P.2d 479, regardinr
finality of the decree ·when clear on its face.

1

Appellants submit that the Decree of Distribution of
September 27, 1956 was clear and unequivocal in stating:

"1. That in accordance with the Last Will
and Testament of deceased, the entire rest, residue
and remainder of the estate of ]\files Edward
Miller, also known as Miles E. Miller, deceased, is
distributed and set over to Nettie Knudsen Miller."
No possible ambiguity or uncertainty existed on thP
face of the decree. The reference to the will was a recital
to show that Miller died testate. It is not an incorpora
ti on by reference under the general rule and cases refer
red to above, and the decree in its absolute form muil
prevail over any other possible construction of the will
The decree, unappealed from, was final and concluded
the rights of all parties interested under the will. Tllf
will merged into the decree. All parties' interests there·
after are measured by the decree and not the will. Ser
Keating v. Smith, 154- Cal. 186, 97 P. 300; Bank of Awr
.
'
""50 •)ryQ
ica, N.T.
& N.A.
v. Hennelly, 102 Cal. App. ')d
~ I , ~P.2d 76.
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POINT III.
THE 1956 DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION WAS FINAL
AND !\TAY NOT NOW BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED OR
REVIEWED.

73-1-7 tTCA 1953 rnakPs prohah~ deert>es final and conclusive, wlwre tht> court had jurisdiction and after proper
notif'e appointed tlw executor, and after time for appeal.
75-1-8 PCA 1953 specifically prohibits impeachment of
such final decret>s by eollateral attack.

Respondents conceded in Paragra])h -! of their
complaint (R. 2) that the will of :~.files Miller "was duly
admitted to probate in th0 above entitled court and the
real estate above particularly described was thereafter
distributed by said court in accordance with said last
will and testament." No fraud of any kind, lack of
jurisdiction or other matter going to the validity of the
decree was alleged by respondents, and thus, respondents'
suit to quiet title is in no way a direct attack in equity
on the decree.
30A Ani. Jur. 762, Sec. 844, states the general rule
that:
"A judgment is not subject to collateral attack where the court had ;jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties or, in a proceeding in
rem, of the res." Cited is Erickson v. McCullough,
91Utah159, 63 P.2d 595, 109 A.L.R. 332.
Probate matters are in rem. Where jurisdiction is
properly acquired and the respondents have conceded
this, the only remedy from a decree in probate is by
appeal or attack for extrinsic fraud. Barrette v. Whit-

18
3fi Utah 57-t, lOfi P. 52:2, 37 L.RA. ( N:::l) :-ms: 1Ve 11
ant v. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 5-1- rtah 181, 182 P.
189.
11ey,

30A Am. Jur. 77-1-, Sec. 858, statPs that a suit tri
quiet title is a collateral attack on a judgment, where thr
suit is an impeachment of the rights in property created
by the judgment, citing Kalb v. German Savings & Loan
Society, 25 "\Vash. 349, 65 P. 557, and Lee 1:. Ilan;e11.
195 Okla. 178, 156 P.2d 134.
Other sections of the probate code, namely, 75-11-37,
75-12-9, 75-14-12 and 75-14-15 UCA 1953, provide for tlw
finality and conclusiveness of probate decrees. These
sections were cited and construed by our court in Auer
bach v. Samuels, supra, which held:
"Upon the basis of the notices the plaintifff
were charged with knowledge of the probate pro
ceeding and under a duty to assert any claims
they had or be concluded by the decrees entered
The authorities quite uniformly agree that this
applies to rights devolving upon the interpretation of the terms of the will; and this is so even
though at a later time the decree may be regar~ed
as not in conformity with the correct constructwn
thereof."

Nelson v. Howells, supra, held that the probatP
decree is the interpretation of the will, and the conclu
siveness of probate final accounts and decrees, in absensr
of fraud has been determined by our court in construing
75-11-37 'UCA 1953 in In re Linford' s Estate, 121 Utah
113, 239 P.2d 200; In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah e~.
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lfJS P. 705; In r(' Bruuk's Estate, 83 l'tah 506, 30 P.2d
1OGf>. 1'h(' rule was restated by our court in In re Rice
[~'state. I 11 Utah -l-28, 182 P.2d 111, as follows:
''A decree of distribution in probate proceedings after due and legal notice, by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter, is conclusive
as to the fund, property, items and matters covered hy and properly included within the decree,
until set aside or modified by the court entering
the decree in the manner prescribed by law, or
until reversed on appeal."
See also In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217.
75-1-8 UCA 1953 was referred to in In re Latsis
Estate, supra, where it was determined that an unconditional decree finally closed the probate proceedings and
settled the rights of the parties interested in the property involved, the decree demanding the respect to which
a final decree is entitled under that statute. Tiller v.
Norto11, 123 Utah 42, 253 P.2d 618, impressed in the
law the finality of the probate decree. See also Sn;yder
v. ftfordock, 26 Utah 233, 73 P. 22.
Trask v. Walker's Estate, 100 Vt. 51, 134 Atl. 853,
and Nelsou v. Howells, supra, are both citt->d in the A111wtatio11 at 136 .A.L.R. 1183 entitled "Rule of Res .Judicata as Applied to Judicial Construction of Wills." The
Trask case involved a will with a devise of the residue
to the wife of the testator, an acknowledgment of testator's children, and language indicating that the wife
should have the use and disposition of the residuary
rstatP. The plaintiffs, as the respondents here, claimed
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that the wife took only a life estate, with remainders in
plaintiffs. The Vermont court held that this was a devise
of a fee to the wife; that the decree of distribution was
a construction of the will by the probate court; and that
where no appeal was taken, the property vested in fee
in the wife, and the decree could not subsequently be
attacked. The Trask case nicely sums up the whole ar
gument of appellants.
CON CLURION
Appellants submit that Miles Miller's will created
an unqualified fee simple interest in Nettie. The 1950
decree of dstribution by clear, unequivocal language gave
to and confirmed in Nettie that unqualified fee interest.
That decree was the interpretation of the will. The decree was unconditional and final and not subject tu
collateral attack.
The judgment givmg interests to respondents a.remaindermen or trust beneficiaries should be reversed.
and the fee interest in Nettie Miller should be confirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES W. BELE8S, JR.
416 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Defendants and
respondents

